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A Game-Theoretic Model of Sexual Harassment 
Abstract 
 We focus on the interaction between a male employee and his supervisor and analyze a 
game-theoretic model of sexual harassment in the workplace. The male employee is accused of 
sexually harassing a female employee and the supervisor's task is to gather evidence and then 
determine whether to legally charge the male employee with sexual harassment. The evidence 
gathering process is random and concrete evidence is available to the supervisor with probability 
one-half. Our analysis of this strategic interaction leads to four results. First, we delineate the game 
in extensive form. Second, we specify the matrix that represents the normal form of the extensive 
form. Third, we show that there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game between the 
male employee and his supervisor. Finally, we show that there exists a mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium in the same male employee-supervisor game. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Overview 
 Sexual harassment in the workplace is now legally prohibited in almost fifty countries in 
the world (McCann 2005). In the United States, employment discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin is and has been illegal since the passage of Title VII of the 
United States Civil Rights Act of 1964. In this regard, Basu (2003) tells us that the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created in 1965 to administer and enforce this 
statute. The straightforward implication of this course of action is that it is illegal to engage in any 
kind of sexual harassment in the workplace in the United States. In the United Kingdom, sexual 
harassment has been considered to be one kind of unlawful discrimination and its proscription has 
been codified in section 4A of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 (Pina et al. 2009). In Australia, 
sexual harassment is covered by the federal Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 and by a variety of 
state level anti-discrimination laws (McDonald 2012).  
The salience and the extent of sexual harassment in the United States was recently 
highlighted in a riveting article in the 5 October 2017 edition of the New York Times by Jodi Kantor 
and Megan Twohey. In this article, Ms. Kantor and Ms. Twohey pointed out that the prominent 
Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein had paid off a number of women who had, over the years, 
accused him of sexually harassing them. This article has now led to many other stories in the print 
and broadcast media that have collectively made people aware of the fact that sexual harassment 
in the workplace is apparently rampant. With this increased awareness has come a series of 
resignations or firings of prominent media personalities such as Matt Lauer, formerly of NBC 
News, Bill O’Reilly, formerly of Fox News, Charlie Rose, formerly of the Charlie Rose show, and 
Tavis Smiley, formerly of the Tavis Smiley show on PBS.  
4 
 
Given the legal and now obvious public significance of the topic of sexual harassment in 
the workplace, it is of considerable interest to ascertain what economists and feminist scholars 
have written on this topic. Therefore, before stating the central research question that we wish to 
analyze in this paper, we first briefly review the extant literature in economics and in feminist 
discourse on sexual harassment in the workplace.  
1.2. Review of literature 
In a comparatively early paper, Basu (2003) first distinguishes between what he calls a 
single contract or a small number of contracts of a specific kind and a large number of contracts 
of the same kind. He then uses this distinction to develop a theoretical model to explain why society 
might want to intervene legislatively to control sexual harassment in the workplace. Browne 
(2006) takes an expansive view of the phenomenon of sexual harassment and argues that women’s 
responses to the scourge of sexual harassment can be understood as reflections of the different 
evolved sexual psychologies of the sexes.  
Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2006) focus on the United States military and conduct an 
econometric analysis of the relationship between sexual harassment and the job satisfaction and 
intended turnover of active duty women. They demonstrate that experiencing sexually harassing 
behavior is definitely linked to both diminished job satisfaction and to an increased desire to leave 
the military. Taking a cross-cultural perspective on the problem. Luthar and Luthar (2007) show 
that sexual harassment by men and the tolerance of such harassment by women vary across 
different nations because of basic differences in cultures and values. 
Hersch (2011) points out that even though sexual harassment in the workplace is illegal in 
the United States, many workers report that they have been harassed in this way. In addition, 
relative to male workers, female workers face a far higher risk of being harassed sexually. Farhang 
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et al. (2015) study opinion assignment and authorship on the United States Courts of Appeals. 
They show that female and more liberal judges are substantially more likely to write opinions in 
sexual harassment cases. This happens not because of some policy driven behavior by “female and 
liberal assigners” but instead because of an institutional environment in which judges seek out the 
opinions they wish to write.  
Mackinnon (2016) looks at sexual harassment in schools in the United States and Title IX’s 
guarantee of equal educational outcomes on the basis of sex. She contends that if the institutional 
liability standard of deliberate indifference for damages in private suits was replaced with an 
international human rights liability standard then power would be shifted into the hands of the 
survivors of sexual harassment and there would be positive change toward sex equality in 
education. Hersch (2018) computes what she calls a “value of statistical harassment (VSH)” and 
maintains that if the maximum damages awarded under federal law were increased to equal the so 
called VSH then this would create the right economic incentives for organizations to deter sexual 
harassment. Finally, the survey-based study of Goldberg et al. (2019) documents the ways in which 
an organization’s tolerance of sexual harassment influences the effectiveness of the sexual 
harassment investigative training that is imparted to human resource managers.  
Moving on to the writings of feminist scholars, many have noted that the sexual harassment 
phenomenon “arises from men’s economic power over women, which enables them to exploit and 
coerce women sexually…” (McDonald 2012, p. 6). In this regard, Samuels (2003) contends that, 
from a feminist perspective, power is not a direct or primary force. Instead, in contemporary 
society, the balance of power lies with men and hence even when women are in more senior 
positions relative to men, they are made more vulnerable by virtue of the fact that they are women.  
6 
 
Feminist scholars have also pointed out that the causes and the outcomes of sexual 
harassment can frequently be understood in terms of three features of a workplace (Welsh 1999, 
McDonald 2012). These three features include workplace culture, the gendered nature of an 
individual’s work group, and the differential power of workers. So, inter alia, these three features 
help explain why, in the face of covert or overt sexual harassment, women often stay silent in the 
workplace. In this regard, Cairns (1997) contends that because of patriarchal socialization in the 
workplace, women are often disempowered and take on the position of the “Other” relative to a 
male norm. As a result, women tend to accommodate notions of femininity defined by male norms. 
As a result of the logic in the preceding two sentences, women may either believe that their 
experiences are not real or that it is they who are in the wrong. In either of these two cases, the 
result often is the use of silence by women to either resist or to hold back and refuse to participate 
in the workplace.  
Finally and in contrast to the perspective of Cairns (1997) that we have just discussed, 
Hunter (2002) and Wear et al. (2007) have proposed an alternate explanation for why women often 
stay silent in the face of sexual harassment. According to these researchers, many younger women 
have grown up in an age in which feminists and feminism have been delineated negatively in the 
media. As such, these younger women either seek to distance themselves from such negative media 
characterizations or think of themselves as “non-gendered subjects,” in the process, disavowing 
both their femininity and any disadvantages flowing from this femininity.  
The studies by economists and feminist scholars discussed in this section have certainly 
advanced our understanding of the many facets of sexual harassment in the workplace. Even so, 
we would now like to emphasize three points. First, consistent with an observation made in 
McDonald (2012), existing studies of sexual harassment in the workplace are mainly empirical or 
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case study based and they rarely employ mathematical modeling of any kind. Second and once 
again consistent with a suggestion in McDonald (2012), there is a need for methodological 
research on the topic of sexual harassment in the workplace. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is no research in either feminist economics or in feminist discourse more generally that 
analyzes the game-theoretic aspects of sexual harassment in the workplace. Given this lacuna in 
the literature, the principal research question that we study is the strategic interaction between a 
male employee who is accused of sexual harassment and his supervisor who must determine 
whether to legally charge this male employee with sexual harassment.4 We undertake this exercise 
and in so doing, contribute to the literature by providing what we believe is the first formal analysis 
of a game-theoretic model of sexual harassment in the workplace.  
To this end, in what follows, section 2 describes the game model with two distinctive 
features. Our motivation for using this particular model stems from our belief that the model 
captures the most common features of the underlying dispute resolution process in a 
straightforward manner. First, a male employee is accused of sexually harassing a female co-
worker and the supervisor’s task is to gather evidence and to then determine whether to legally 
charge the male employee with sexual harassment in the workplace. Second, the process of 
gathering evidence is not deterministic but probabilistic. Specifically, what this second feature 
means is that evidence is available to the supervisor not with certainty but with probability one-
half. Section 3 delineates the game we study in extensive form. Section 4 specifies the matrix that 
represents the normal form of the extensive form described in section 3. Section 5 points out that 
there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the strategic interaction or game between the accused 
                                                          
4
  
McDonald (2012, p. 11) notes that “[e]vidence also indicates that [sexual harassment] continues to be experienced mainly by 
women…” This provides the impetus for supposing that the employee who is charged with sexual harassment in our model is male. 
That said, we acknowledge that it is certainly possible for the person charged with sexual harassment to be female.  
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male employee and his supervisor. Section 6 demonstrates that there exists a mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium in the same male employee-supervisor game. Finally, section 7 concludes and then 
discusses an extension of our model in which the payoffs in the game under study are not zero-
sum.  
2. The Game Model 
 Consider a workplace in which a particular female employee accuses a fellow male 
employee of sexual harassment. The male employee’s supervisor (player 1) suspects the male 
employee (player 2) and begins the process of gathering evidence to determine whether he will 
formally charge the male employee with breaking the law and engaging in sexual harassment.5 As 
noted in section 1 and to keep the problem interesting, we suppose that the evidence gathering 
process is probabilistic. As such, concrete evidence will be available to the supervisor only with 
probability 1 2.⁄ 6 
The accused male employee knows that his supervisor is in the midst of gathering evidence 
but he does not know whether this supervisor has gathered concrete evidence or not. The game 
between the supervisor and the accused male employee proceeds as follows: The supervisor 
realizes whether or not he has evidence, i.e., the state of the world, and on the basis of this 
realization he selects his action. He can either legally charge the accused male employee with 
sexual harassment in the workplace (Charge) or drop the charge and absolve this employee of the 
sexual harassment accusation (Drop).  
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The work of Berdahl and Moore (2007) and McCabe and Hardman (2005) tells us that women are generally less accepting than 
men of sexual harassment in the workplace. Therefore, even though from a modeling standpoint, thinking of the supervisor as male 
is without loss of generality, in any given practical instance, the gender of the supervisor may affect the vigor with which a charge 
of sexual harassment is pursued by this supervisor.  
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If, instead of 1 2,⁄  we picked a different numerical value, then the values of some of the payoffs to the two players being studied 
would change but our analysis would not change substantively. That said, in the Appendix, we discuss one way in which this 
particular aspect of our model might be generalized.  
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Once legally charged by the supervisor, the male employee has two possible actions. He 
can either confess to breaking the law and to sexually harassing the female employee (Confess) or 
he can deny the charge and maintain his innocence (Deny). As a result of this strategic interaction 
between the supervisor and the accused male employee, the payoffs to the two players are as 
follows: If the supervisor drops the sexual harassment charge and effectively frees the accused 
male employee then both players get 0. If the supervisor legally charges the male employee and 
this employee confesses to the charge then the supervisor gets 𝑎 > 0 and the male employee gets −𝑎. If the supervisor charges the male employee and this employee denies the charge and 
maintains his innocence then the payoffs to the two players depend on the gathered evidence. If 
the supervisor does not have concrete evidence then the accused employee is vindicated and he 
gets 𝑏 > 0 but the supervisor is embarrassed and hence this supervisor gets −𝑏. On the other hand, 
if the supervisor does have concrete evidence then he is vindicated and gets 𝑏 > 0 and the accused 
male employee is fired and hence gets −𝑏. Our subsequent mathematical analysis makes sense 
only when 𝑏 > 𝑎 and hence we assume that this is the case in the remainder of this paper.  
The reader should note the “zero-sum” nature of the payoffs arising from the strategic 
interaction between the supervisor and the accused male employee. What this means is that player 𝑖′𝑠 gain is equal to player 𝑗′𝑠 loss, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, and therefore these two payoffs always sum to zero.7 With 
this background in place, our next task is to draw the game tree that represents the extensive form 
of the game that we have just described.  
                                                          
7
  
Our game-theoretic model with a zero-sum payoff structure can be used to describe many economic problems---like the sexual 
harassment problem---that share the following structure: a higher-ranking individual (our supervisor) must decide whether or not 
to formally charge a lower-ranking individual (our male employee) who has been accused of some kind of wrongdoing (sexual 
harassment in our case). That said, note that this “wrongdoing” can refer to many things such as embezzlement of funds, computer 
hacking, and spreading false and/or malicious information. Given a particular kind of wrongdoing, in principle, what will differ 
from model to model are the actual numerical payoffs, the probabilities with which the different states of the word arise, and the 
probabilities with which the different players play their strategies in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.  
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3. The Extensive Form 
 In the language of game theory---see Tadelis (2013, pp. 136-137)---the game we have 
described in section 2 is a game of imperfect information. As is standard in the analysis of such 
games, we introduce a third player named “Nature” who does not receive any payoff but who 
moves first and randomly selects the state of the world, i.e., whether concrete evidence does or 
does not exist. This is shown in the topmost or first level of the game tree in Figure 1 below. We  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Extensive form of the supervisor-male employee game 
notice that concrete evidence exists with probability 1 2⁄  and that it does not with complementary 
probability 1 2.⁄  Once Nature has moved, the supervisor moves, deciding either to legally charge 
the male employee or to drop the charge against him. This is shown in the second level of the game 
tree in figure 1. Once the supervisor has moved, the accused male employee moves, acting either 
to confess to or to deny the legal charge made against him. This is shown in the third and lowest 
SUPERVISOR
Confess
MALE EMPLOYEE
Charge
Deny
NATURE
SUPERVISOR
Drop 
0.5
Evidence
Confess
Deny
Charge 
0.5
Drop 
No Evidence
11 
 
level of the game tree in figure 1. The payoffs received by the two players are indicated at the 
bottom of the branches depicting the different contingencies that might arise in this game.  
Two points about this game are now worth emphasizing. First, observe that even though 
the accused male employee observes the supervisor’s move, he does not observe Nature’s move. 
Second, as shown with the dashed line in figure 1, the male employee’s information set cuts across 
the “branches” of the game tree. Therefore, in the game under study, there are no proper subgames 
other than the entire game itself. We now proceed to specify the matrix that represents the normal 
form of the extensive form that we have just described in this section.  
4. The Normal Form 
The supervisor acts at two information sets following Nature’s choice of “Evidence” or 
“No Evidence.” Observe that we can think of “Evidence” and “No Evidence” as the two possible 
states of the world. Now, in each case, this supervisor has two actions “Charge” or “Drop.” This 
means that he has four pure-strategies. Let 𝑥𝑦 ∈ {𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐷, 𝐷𝐶, 𝐷𝐷} denote the strategy of player 1 
(supervisor) where 𝑥 follows “Evidence” and 𝑦 follows “No Evidence.” In contrast to player 1, 
player 2 (male employee) acts at only one information set and hence his strategies are simply {𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑦}.  
For each strategy profile, we can compute the respective payoffs as the expected or mean 
payoffs each player gets on the assumption that Nature is mixing half-and-half. This process gives 
us the following matrix  
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Player 1: Supervisor 
Player 2: Male Employee 
 Confess Deny 𝐶𝐶 𝑎, −𝑎 0, 0 𝐶𝐷 𝑎 2,⁄  −𝑎 2⁄  𝑏 2,⁄  −𝑏 2⁄  𝐷𝐶 𝑎 2,⁄  −𝑎 2⁄  −𝑏 2,⁄  𝑏 2⁄  𝐷𝐷 0, 0 0, 0 
 
Table 1: The game in normal form  
We now use this normal form representation to discuss whether pure-strategy Nash equilibria exist 
in the game that we are studying. 
5. Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
 Inspecting Table 1 carefully, we see that the supervisor has two strictly dominated 
strategies. In particular, 𝐷𝐶 is dominated by 𝐶𝐶 and 𝐷𝐷 is dominated by 𝐶𝐷. Therefore, we can 
eliminate these two strategies and focus on the reduced game represented by the following matrix 
 
 
 
Player 1: Supervisor 
Player 2: Male Employee 
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑦 𝐶𝐶 𝑎, −𝑎 0, 0 𝐶𝐷 𝑎 2,⁄  −𝑎 2⁄  𝑏 2,⁄  −𝑏 2⁄  
 
Table 2: The reduced game in normal form 
Inspecting the various strategies and the payoffs in Table 2 carefully, it is straightforward to verify 
that this reduced game does not have any pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This notwithstanding, we 
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now demonstrate that there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in this supervisor-male 
employee game.  
6. Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
Let the supervisor (player 1) choose 𝐶𝐶 (𝐶𝐷) with probability 𝑝 (1 − 𝑝). Similarly, let the 
male employee (player 2) choose 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠 (𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑦) with probability 𝑞 (1 − 𝑞). Now, for the male 
employee to be indifferent between his two pure-strategies, we must have  𝑝(−𝑎) + (1 − 𝑝)(− 𝑎 2⁄ ) = 𝑝(0) + (1 − 𝑝)(− 𝑏 2)⁄    (1) 
Solving equation (1) for the probability 𝑝, we get  𝑝 = (𝑏 − 𝑎) (𝑎 + 𝑏)⁄ .     (2) 
Now, for the supervisor to be indifferent between his two pure-strategies, we need 𝑞(𝑎) + (1 − 𝑞)(0) = 𝑞(𝑎 2)⁄ + (1 − 𝑞)(𝑏 2)⁄ .    (3) 
Solving equation (3) for the probability 𝑞, we obtain 𝑞 = 𝑏 (𝑎 + 𝑏)⁄ .      (4) 
 Given the values of the two probabilities in equations (2) and (4), we deduce that a unique 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the supervisor-male employee game exists. In this equilibrium, 
the supervisor (male employee) plays his optimal strategy 𝑆1 (𝑆2) and we have 
 𝑆1 = (𝑏−𝑎𝑎+𝑏) 𝐶𝐶 + ( 2𝑎𝑎+𝑏) 𝐶𝐷, 𝑆2 = ( 𝑏𝑎+𝑏) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑠 + ( 𝑎𝑎+𝑏) 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑦.   (5) 
 
Equation (5) tells us that when he has evidence, the only Nash equilibrium of this game is for the 
supervisor to legally charge the male employee (𝑏 − 𝑎) (𝑎 + 𝑏)⁄  proportion of the time and to 
drop the charge 2𝑎 (𝑎 + 𝑏)⁄  proportion of the time. For the male employee, it is optimal to confess 𝑏 (𝑎 + 𝑏)⁄  proportion of the time when he is charged.  
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The interpretation of equation (5) can be simplified considerably by focusing on the special 
case where 𝑏 = 2𝑎. In this case, straightforward computations show that 𝑝 = 1 3⁄  and that 𝑞 =2 3⁄ . So, in this special case, the only Nash equilibrium of this game is for the supervisor to legally 
charge the male employee one-third of the time and to drop the charge two-thirds of the time. For 
the male employee, it is optimal to confess two-thirds of the time when he is legally charged. That 
said, observe that because the only proper subgame is the entire game itself, the only Nash 
equilibrium is also a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Put differently, it is not possible to find a 
Nash equilibrium that is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  
We now conclude this section with two observations about our analysis thus far in this 
paper. First, it is true that in our game-theoretic model, the structure of the payoffs to the two 
players arising from their strategic interaction is zero-sum. However, this feature in and of itself 
does not allow us to conclude that the only equilibria must be in mixed strategies. As shown by 
the work of Duersch et al. (2012), it is certainly possible for a finite, two-player, and zero-sum 
game to possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies.  
Second, the insights that our game-theoretic analysis brings to the actual problem of sexual 
harassment in the workplace are fourfold. Specifically, our model captures (i) the fact that an 
accused male employee’s supervisor plays a prominent role in determining whether or not to bring 
legal charges against the accused employee, (ii) the point that the evidence gathering process 
typically does not lead to the accumulation of foolproof evidence, (iii) the notion that there are 
strategic aspects to the optimal actions that are taken by both the supervisor and the accused male 
employee, and (iv) the idea that it makes sense for each of the two players to keep his rival guessing 
about his true intentions in the dispute resolution process. These findings are broadly consistent 
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with the observation in McDonald (2012, p. 8) that “the extent to which [sexual harassment] occurs 
is impacted by organizational characteristics…”  
Finally, the preceding two points notwithstanding, our analysis in this paper does have 
some limitations and therefore can be improved upon. In this regard, we could (i) analyze a game 
model that allows for repeated interactions between the accused male employee and his supervisor 
as more and presumably better information becomes available, (ii) formally model the learning 
that occurs on the parts of both players over time about the actual events that have taken place, and 
(iii) alter the numerical payoffs so that they are not always zero-sum but take on other values. We 
now demonstrate in the last two paragraphs of section 7 below how, for example, this third point 
can be addressed by discussing an extension of the model that we have been analyzing thus far.  
7. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we concentrated on the interaction between a male employee and his 
supervisor and analyzed a game-theoretic model of sexual harassment in the workplace. The male 
employee was accused of sexually harassing a female employee and the supervisor’s task was to 
gather evidence and to then determine whether to legally charge the male employee with sexual 
harassment. The evidence gathering process was random and concrete evidence was available to 
the supervisor with probability one-half. Our analysis of this strategic interaction led to four 
findings. First, we delineated the game in extensive form. Second, we specified the normal form 
of the extensive form. Third, we pointed out that there was no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in 
the game between the male employee and his supervisor. Finally, we demonstrated that there 
existed a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the same male employee-supervisor game.  
 In the Appendix, we describe a general theoretical framework that can be used to shed light 
on many questions that are related to the issues we have discussed in this paper. Game-theoretic 
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studies of sexual harassment in the workplace that analyze this kind of an extended model will 
provide additional insights into an odious phenomenon that has important economic, 
psychological, and social ramifications for many individuals in contemporary society.  
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Appendix 
 Consider the following game-theoretic model that delineates the strategic interaction 
between the male employee and his supervisor and in which the payoffs to the two players are not 
zero-sum. The male employee chooses whether or not to sexually harass a female co-worker. The 
supervisor determines how much effort (𝑒) to exert in gathering evidence about the male 
employee’s potential harassment of his female co-worker. This effort 𝑒 ∈ [0, 1]. Exerting effort to 
gather evidence is costly and hence when the supervisor exerts effort 𝑒 to gather evidence, this 
costs him 𝑐(𝑒) = 100𝑒2. If it turns out that the male employee has not harassed his female co-
worker then he receives a payoff of 0, his supervisor pays the evidence gathering cost without any 
benefit from this evidence gathering process, yielding a payoff to him of −100𝑒2. If the male 
employee has harassed his female co-worker then his payoff depends on whether or not he is 
legally charged by his supervisor. If he is charged then his payoff is −100 and his supervisor’s 
payoff is 100 − 100𝑒2. In contrast, if the male employee is not charged by his supervisor then his 
payoff is 50 and his supervisor’s payoff is −100𝑒2. Finally, if the male employee harasses his 
female co-worker and his supervisor exerts effort 𝑒 to gather evidence then the male employee is 
charged by his supervisor with probability 𝑒 and is not charged with complementary probability (1 − 𝑒).  
 The above modeling framework can be used to shed light on several questions pertaining 
to the strategic interaction between the male employee and his supervisor that we have not 
analyzed in this paper. Here are three examples of such questions. First, if the supervisor believes 
that the male employee has harassed his female co-worker for sure then what is the optimal value 
of the effort exertion level 𝑒? Second, if the supervisor believes that the male employee has not 
harassed his female co-worker for sure then what is the optimal value of 𝑒? Finally, does this game 
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between the male employee and his supervisor have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium or must we 
focus on a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium once again? 
 
 
